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Abstract
Many voting rules are based on minimization or maximization principle. Like-
wise, in the field of logic-based knowledge representation and reasoning, many
belief change or inconsistency handling operators make use of minimization. Sur-
prisingly, minimization has not played a major role in the field of judgment ag-
gregation, in spite of its proximity to voting theory and logic-based knowledge
representation and reasoning. Here we make a first step in the study of judgment
aggregation rules based on minimization, and propose a classification of judgment
aggregation rules based on some minimization or maximization principle. We dis-
tinguish four families. The rules of the first family compute the collective judgment
for each issue, using proposition-wise majoritarian aggregation, and then restore
consistency using some minimal change principle. The rules of the second family
proceed in a similar way but take into account the strength of the majority on each
issue. Those of the third family consist in restoring the consistency of the majori-
tarian judgment by removing or changing some individual judgments in a minimal
way. Finally, those of the fourth family are based on some predefined distance be-
tween judgment sets, and look for a consistent collective judgment minimizing the
overall distance to the individual judgment sets. For each family we propose a few
typical rules. While most of these rules are new, a few ones correspond to rules
∗A preliminary version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on
the Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge (TARK-11)[20].
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that have been defined elsewhere. We study the inclusion relationships between
these rules and address some of their social choice theoretic properties.
1 Introduction
In voting theory and in computational social choice, a large body of work focuses on
specific voting rules: how their winner sets compare to each other; their social choice-
theoretic properties; the computational and communication complexity of winner de-
termination; the theoretical and experimental study of manipulability and control; the
amount of information necessary to determine the outcome; etc.
A judgment aggregation problem is specified by a set of logically related issues,
an agenda, on which the agents cast judgments. The judgments are typically Boolean
evaluations of the agenda issues. A judgment aggregation rule amalgamates the indi-
vidual judgments into a collective set of judgments, which should adhere to the logical
relations of the agenda issues. Unlike in voting, the bulk of the research in judgment
aggregation focuses on possibility and impossibility results: typically, one looks for
minimal conditions on the structure of the agenda, on the allowed judgment sets, or
on the properties of the logical system, implying the existence or the non-existence of
judgment aggregation rules satisfying a small set of desirable properties (such as non-
dictatorship, unanimity, independence etc.); or else, one looks for a characterization
of all judgment aggregation rules satisfying a set of properties, possibly under some
domain restrictions. But the focus on specific rules, or families of voting rules, and
their properties, has been the topic of few papers. Still, there are a few exceptions, that
we list now.
• The premise-based procedure has been introduced in [19] under the name “issue-
by-issue voting” and studied in [11, 26]. For this procedure, the agenda is
assumed to be partitioned into two subsets: premises and conclusions. The
premises are logically independent. The individuals vote on the premises and the
majority on each premise is used to find the collective outcome for that premise.
From these collective outcomes on the premises, the collective conclusions are
derived using either the logical relationships among, or some external constraints
regarding the agenda issues. On the other hand, in the conclusion-based proce-
dure, individuals decide privately on the premises and express publicly only their
judgments on the conclusions.
• The more general sequential procedures [22, 8, 21] proceed this way: the ele-
ments of the agenda are considered sequentially, following a fixed linear order
over the agenda (corresponding for instance to temporal precedence or to pri-
ority) and earlier decisions constrain later ones. Collective consistency is guar-
anteed by definition. Of course, in the general case, the result depends on the
choice of the order, i.e. it is path-dependent. Premise-based procedures are spe-
cific instances of sequential procedures.
• Quota-based rules [8, 6] are a class of rules where each proposition of the agenda
is associated with a quota, and the proposition is accepted only if the proportion
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of individuals accepting it is above the quota. For example, uniform rules take
the same quota for all elements of the agenda. The majority rule is a special case
of quota-based rules. In [8] sequential quota rules are also considered.
• Distance-based rules [25, 29] assume a predefined distance between judgment
sets and/or profiles and choose as collective outcome the consistent judgment
sets which are closest (for some notion of closeness) to the individual judgments
(see Section 3.4).
Even if a few families of judgment aggregation rules have been proposed and stud-
ied, still the focus on the research is more on the search for impossibility theorems and
axiomatic characterizations of families of rules, which contrasts with voting theory,
where voting rules are defined and studied per se.
In voting theory, quite a number of rules are based on some minimization (or max-
imization) process: for instance, Kemeny, Dodgson, Slater, ranked pairs, maximin etc.
(We shall not recall the definition of all these voting rules; the reader can refer, for
instance, to [2] for a survey.) Minimization is also a common way of defining rea-
soning rules (such as belief revision operators, inconsistency handling procedures, or
nonmonotonic inference rules) in the community of logic-based knowledge represen-
tation and reasoning: typically, one deals with inconsistency by looking for maximal
consistent subsets of an inconsistent knowledge base. Belief revision often amounts
to incorporating a piece of information to a knowledge base while minimizing the in-
formation loss from the initial knowledge base. Similar minimization processes are at
work in reasoning about action, belief update and belief merging.
In contrast, with the exception of distance-based rules, minimization has rarely
been considered for judgment aggregation. Here we aim at filling this gap by propos-
ing several families of minimization-based rules, and for each family, a few specific
rules that we argue to be among the most natural ones. Our rules maximize the portion
of a profile we wish to keep. The way such a maximization is defined depends on the
specific rule. Thus, the maximization operated by our aggregation rules is equivalent
to minimizing the portion of a profile we wish to remove. In other words, we call our
rules “based on minimization”, but we could as well say that our rules are based on
maximization. Most of the rules we introduce here are new, while a few of them cor-
respond, up to some minor details, to judgment aggregation rules already proposed in
the literature. We relate them to similar rules in voting theory and/or knowledge rep-
resentation and reasoning. We study their interrelationships by showing that in most
cases, the proposed rules are inclusion-wise incomparable. We also study their links
with existing aggregation rules such as sequential or quota-based rules, and some of
their social choice theoretic properties (majority-preservation, unanimity, monotonic-
ity, reinforcement).
Aggregation conditions such as anonymity (a permutation on the individual judg-
ment sets does not alter the collective outcome) and neutrality (the elements of the
agenda are aggregated in the same way) can be defined as usual (and we omit their
formal definitions). It is important to note that none of the rules introduced in this pa-
per satisfies independence (neither do sequential and distance-based rules). For many
agendas, the independence condition is sufficient for an impossibility result to occur
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[23]. On the other hand, independence is a key condition to ensure that an aggrega-
tion function is non manipulable [5, 7]. This makes independence an instrumentally
attractive condition, as it happens for the independence of the irrelevant alternatives
condition in preference aggregation. However, independence has also been severely
criticized in the literature (see, for example, [4, 26]) for being incompatible with a
framework whose aim is to aggregate logically interrelated propositions.
2 Judgment aggregation rules
2.1 General definitions
Let L be a propositional language built on a finite set of propositional symbols PS. Cn
denotes logical closure, that is, Cn(S) = {α ∈ L | S |= α}. Lastly, if S is a finite set of
formulas of L, then
V
(S) is the conjunction of all formulas in S.
Definition 1 (agendas, judgment sets, profiles)
• an agenda is a finite set X = {ϕ1,¬ϕ1, . . . ,ϕm,¬ϕm} of propositional formulae of
L, consisting of pairs of propositions ϕi,¬ϕi, and containing neither tautologies
not contradictions. The pre-agenda [X ] associated with X is [X ] = {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕm}.
A subagenda of X is a subset of X being itself an agenda, that is, containing pairs
of propositions ϕ,¬ϕ, where ϕ ∈ [X ].
• a judgment set over X is a subset of X. A judgment set A is complete if for every
pair {ϕ,¬ϕ} in X, A contains either ϕ or ¬ϕ. A judgment set A is consistent ifV{ϕ j|ϕ j ∈ A} is satisfiable. JS(X) and CJS(X) respectively denote the set of all
complete judgment sets, and the set of all consistent and complete judgment sets
over X.
• an n-voter profile over X is a collection P = 〈A1, . . . ,An〉 where each Ai is a
consistent and complete1 judgment set.
We now define judgment aggregation rules.2 As in voting theory, we distinguish
between deterministic rules, mapping a profile to a single collective judgment set, and
nondeterministic rules (or correspondences), mapping a profile to a nonempty set of
collective judgment sets.
Definition 2 (judgment aggregation rules)
• a deterministic judgment aggregation rule is a mapping fn,X associating with
every profile P = 〈A1, . . . ,An〉 a consistent judgment set fn,X (P). A deterministic
aggregation rule fn,X is complete if for every profile P, fn,X (P) is complete.
1In judgment aggregation consistent and complete judgment sets are usually assumed. However, while
consistency seems an indispensable requirement, completeness can be dismissed, at least in some contexts.
Some works [15, 12] investigated what happens if we allow voters to abstain from expressing judgments
on some propositions in the agenda. We could also define profiles more generally by allowing individual
judgment sets to be incomplete. Most of our results would not be altered, but some of the definitions,
especially distance-based rules, would be more complicated.
2Strictly speaking, a rule is a function; we keep the terminology “rule” for the sake of the parallel with
voting theory.
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• a nondeterministic judgment aggregation rule (or judgment aggregation corre-
spondence) is a mapping Fn,X associating with every profile P a nonempty set of
consistent judgment sets Fn,X (P).
Most of the time, when referring to judgment aggregation rules we will keep n and
X implicit when they are clear from the context, i.e., fn,X (resp. Fn,X ) will be simply
denoted as f (resp. F). Also, by a slight abuse of language, if P= 〈A1, . . . ,An〉, then we
will write f (A1, . . . ,An) and F(A1, . . . ,An) instead of f (〈A1, . . . ,An〉) and F(〈A1, . . . ,An〉).
As in voting theory, a rule can be obtained from a correspondence using a tie-
breaking mechanism, such as a priority over judgment sets, or over agents. As in
voting, we need nondeterminism because of ties – here, ties between judgment sets.
For instance, if X = {a,¬a} and P = 〈a,a,¬a,¬a〉 then in order to be anonymous
and non-biased, R(P) has to contain the two judgment sets {a} and {¬a}, that is,
R(P) = {{a},{¬a}}. In the rest of the paper we focus on nondeterministic rules, unless
we state the contrary3.
There are two different views of aggregation rules: either we see the output as a
mere collection of consistent judgment sets, or we see it as a closed logical theory.
Definition 3 (logical theory TF(P))
Given a judgment aggregation rule F, and a profile P, we define the logical theory
TF(P) =
T{Cn(A) | A ∈ F(P)}.
Let F and F ′ be two aggregation rules. F and F ′ are theory equivalent, denoted
F =T F ′ if for every profile P we have TF(P) = TF ′(P), (and simply equal, denoted
F = F ′, if for every profile P we have that F(P) = F(P′)). F is at least as discriminant
as F ′ if for every profile P we have TF ′(P)⊆ TF(P). F and F ′ are incomparable if there
exists two profiles P and Q such that TF(P) 6⊆ TF ′(P) and TF(Q) 6⊆ TF ′(Q).
Thus, a formula α is in TF(P) if and only if it can be inferred from every judgment
set in F(P). Note that TF(P) being the intersection of consistent closed logical theories,
it is itself a consistent closed theory.
Definition 4 (majoritarian aggregation)
The majority aggregation rule m is defined as: for every profile P, M(P) is a sin-
gleton judgment set {m(P)} such that for every ψ ∈ X, m(P) contains ψ if and only if a
majority of agents have ψ in their judgment set, that is, if and only if #{i|ψ ∈ Ai}> n2 .
m(P) is called the majoritarian judgment set associated with P. Note that if n is odd
then m(P) is a complete judgment set.
A profile P is majority-consistent if m(P) is a consistent judgment set. A judgment
aggregation rule F is majority-preserving if, for every majority-consistent profile P,
F(P) =T M(P).
Example 1 Consider the pre-agenda [X ] = {p∧ r, p∧ s,q, p∧ q, t} and a profile P of
17 voters, presented in Table 1.
We obtain m(P) = {p∧ r, p∧ s,q,¬(p∧ q), t} (and M(P) = {m(P)}). m(P) is an
inconsistent judgment set, therefore P is not majority-consistent.
3One may also want to require that not only the output of a judgment aggregation rule is a single judgment
set A, but that this judgment set is itself complete. Doing this amounts at having another tie-breaking rule
which, in case of a tie between ϕ and ¬ϕ, specifies how to break it.
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Voters { p∧ r, p∧ s, q, p∧q, t }
A1×6 + + + + +
A2×4 + + - - +
A3×7 - - + - -
m(P) + + + - +
Table 1: The profile P
We end this Section by defining distances between judgment sets and between pro-
files. A distance d between judgment sets over X is a function d : JS(X)× JS(X)→ N
such that for all A,B,C ∈ JS(X), (a) d(A,B) = 0 if and only if A = B, (b) d(A,B) =
d(B,A) and (c) d(A,C) ≤ d(A,B)+ d(B,C). A distance function between profiles is
defined similarly. Finally, the Hamming distance between judgment sets and between
profiles [25, 14] is defined as follows.
Definition 5 (Hamming distance between complete judgment sets dH ) Given two com-
plete judgment sets A and A′ (over the same set of agents and the same agenda), the
Hamming distance dH between A and A′ is defined by
dH(A,A′) = |A\A′|+ |A′ \A|
Now, the distance between two profiles is the sum of the Hamming distance be-
tween their individual judgment sets:
Definition 6 (Hamming distance between profiles DH ) Given two profiles P= 〈A1, . . . ,An〉
and Q = 〈A′1, . . . ,A′n〉, the Hamming distnce between P and Q is defined by
DH(P,Q) =
n
∑
i=1
dH(AiA′i)
3 Four families of aggregation rules
We now give four different families of minimization-based judgment aggregation rules.
3.1 Rules based on the majoritarian judgment set
Definition 7 (rule based on the majoritarian judgment set)
A rule R is based on the majoritarian judgment set if there exists a function f map-
ping every judgment set (consistent or not) to a nonempty set of consistent judgment
sets, such that for every profile P, R(P) = f (m(P)).
This family can be viewed as the counterpart, for judgment aggregation, of voting
rules that are based on the pairwise majority graph (also known as tournament solu-
tions). Being based on the majoritarian judgment set means, in practice, that knowing
the majoritarian judgment set of a profile is enough to determine the outcome of the
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rule, or, equivalently, that two profiles P and Q whose majoritarian judgment coincide
(m(P) = m(Q)) will lead to the same outcome (R(P) = R(Q)). We naturally expect
these rules to be majority-preserving, which is equivalent to saying that the restriction
of f to consistent judgment sets is the identity: if J is consistent, then f (J) = {J}; such
a condition can be seen as the counterpart, for judgment aggregation, of Condorcet-
consistency.
When m(P) is not consistent, we look for a minimal way of restoring consistency by
removing some elements form the agenda. Given a judgment set J, we define the set of
consistent subjudgment sets of J, denoted by Cons(J), as f (J)= {J′⊆ J | J′consistent}.
Defining a rule consists in defining a minimality criteria for the set of formulas removed
from J. There are two obvious choices, consisting in choosing consistent subjudgment
sets of m(P) that that are maximal for, respectively, set inclusion or cardinality, which
corresponds to the following choices for f :
• f (J) = max(Cons(J),⊇);
• f (J) = max(Cons(J), |.|)
Equivalently, these rules consist in looking for, respectively, a minimal subset or a
minimal number of formulas in X to remove such that the profile becomes majority-
consistent. The formal definition we give correspond to this alternative characteriza-
tion.
In the following we use the abbreviation maxcard for of maximal cardinality.
Definition 8 (maximal subagenda rule RMSA)
Given a profile P = 〈A1, . . . ,An〉 on an agenda X, [X ] the pre-agenda associated
with X, and a sub-preagenda [Y ] ⊆ [X ], the restriction of P to Y is P↓Y = 〈A j ∩Y,1 ≤
j ≤ n〉. Let MSA(P) the set of all maximal sub-preagendas [Y ] of [X ] (with respect to
set inclusion) such that P↓Y is majority-consistent. The maximal subagenda judgment
aggregation rule RMSA maps P to RMSA(P) = {m(P↓Y ) | [Y ] ∈MSA(P)}.
Example 2 Consider the same agenda and profile as in Example 1. We obtain that
RMSA(P) =
 {p∧ r, p∧ s, q, t},{p∧ r, p∧ s, ¬(p∧q), t},{q, ¬(p∧q), t}
 .
Instead of looking for maximal majority-consistent subagendas with respect to in-
clusion we may look instead for maxcard majority-consistent subagendas, which leads
to the following judgment aggregation rule, which corresponds, up to some minor de-
tails and for a specific choice of a distance function, to the endpoint judgment aggre-
gation rule defined in [25].
Definition 9 (maxcard subagenda rule RMCSA)
Let MCSA(P) the set of all maxcard sub-preagendas [Y ] of [X ] such that P↓Y is
majority-consistent. The maxcard subagenda judgment aggregation rule RMCSA maps
P to RMCSA(P) = {m(P↓Y ) | [Y ] ∈MCSA(P)}.
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Example 3 Consider again the agenda and profile from Example 1. The sub-preagenda
Y which gives a majority-consistent P↓Y and is maximal is obtained for either Y =
{p∧ r, p∧ s,q, t} or Y = {p∧ r, p∧ s, p∧q, t}. We obtain
RMCSA(P) =
{ {p∧ r, p∧ s, q, t},
{p∧ r, p∧ s, ¬(p∧q), t}
}
.
Proposition 1 Let Cons(m(P)) be the set of all consistent subsets of m(P).
• RMSA(P) = max(Cons(m(P)),⊆).
• RMCSA(P) = max(Cons(m(P)), |.|).
Proof: We give the proof for RMSA only; the proof for RMCSA(P) proceeds exactly
in the same way.
Let [Y ] ∈ MSA(P). We have m(P↓Y ) ⊆ m(P) and m(P↓Y ) is consistent. Assume
that m(P↓Y ) is not a maximal consistent subset of m(P); then there exists a consistent
subagenda Z of X such that m(P↓Y )⊂ Z ⊆ m(P). Since both m(P↓Y ) and Z contains at
most one of ϕ,¬ϕ for every ϕ∈ X (otherwise they would not be consistent), there must
be a ϕ such that either ϕ ∈ Z or ¬ϕ ∈ Z, and ϕ 6∈ [Y ]. But then [Y ]∪{ϕ} ⊆ Z ⊆ m(P)
and Z consistent implies that m([Y ]∪{ϕ}) is a consistent subset of m(P), contradicting
[Y ] ∈MSA(P). Therefore, m(P↓Y ) ∈max(Cons(m(P)),⊆).
Conversely, let Z ∈ max(Cons(m(P)),⊆). Y = {ϕ ∈ X |ϕ ∈ Z or ¬ϕ ∈ Z} is a
preagenda of X , and because Z is a consistent subset of m(P), Z contains at most one
of ϕ,¬ϕ for every ϕ ∈ X , therefore m(P)↓Y = Z. Assume there is a Y ′ ⊃ Y such that
m(P↓Y ′) is consistent. Then m(PY ′)⊃m(PY )=Z, contradicting Z ∈max(Cons(m(P)),⊆
). Therefore, Y is a maximal consistent subpreagenda of P. 
We note that even when n is odd, RMSA(P) and RMCSA(P) may contain incomplete
judgment sets. Take for instance P = 〈{a,b,a∧ b},{a,¬b,¬(a∧ b)},{¬a,b,¬(a∧
b)}〉; then RMSA(P) = RMCSA(P) = {{a,b},{a,¬(a∧ b)},{b,¬(a∧ b)}}. However,
when n is odd, every judgment set in RMSA(P) and a fortiori in RMCSA(P) is equivalent
to a complete judgment set: here, {a,b}, {a,¬(a∧b)} and {b,¬(a∧b)} are equivalent
to, respectively, {a,b,a∧b}, {a,¬b,¬(a∧b)} and {¬a,b,¬(a∧b)}. Formally:
Proposition 2 If n is odd then for every J ∈ RMSA(P) and every J ∈ RMCSA(P), there is
a complete judgment set J′ such that J is equivalent to J′.
Proof: Let J ∈ RMSA(P) and assume J is not equivalent to a complete judgment
set; then there is a ϕ ∈ X such that neither J |= ϕ nor J |= ¬ϕ. Because n is odd, m(P)
is a complete judgment set, and contains either ϕ or ¬ϕ. Without loss of generality,
assume it contains ϕ. Then J ∪{ϕ} ⊆ m(P) and J ∪{ϕ} is consistent, contradicting
J ∈ RMSA(P). The proof for RMCSA follows from the fact that RMCSA(P)⊆ RMSA(P). 
While RMSA, as far as we know, is new, RMCSA coincides with a rule defined in [25].
Definition 10 (endpoint rule [25]) Let d be a distance function between judgment
sets. The judgment aggregation rule Endpointd is defined by: for any profile P,
Endpointd(P) = {J ∈CJS(X) | d(J,m(P))≤ d(J′,m(P)) for all J′ ∈CJS(P)}
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Proposition 3 RMSA =T EndpointdH .
Proof: We claim that for every profile P and every A∈ JS(P), we have A∈MSA(P)
if and only for every J ∈CJS(X) extending A we have dH(J,m(P))≤ dH(J′,m(P)) for
every J′ ∈CJS(X), from which the result follows.
Let A be a consistent subset of m(P) and J ∈ CJS(X) extending A. We have
dH(J,m(P)) ≤ m− |A|. Assume there exists J′ ∈ CJS(X) such that dH(J′,m(P)) <
dH(J,m(P)) ≤ m− |A|. Then |J′ ∩m(P)| > |A|, and J′ ∩m(P) is a consistent subset
of m(P), which implies that A 6∈ MSA(P). Therefore, for every J ∈ CJS(X) extend-
ing A we have dH(J,m(P)) ≤ dH(J′,m(P)) for every J′ ∈CJS(X), which implies that
TEndpoint(P) |= TRMCSA(P).
Conversely, let J ∈CJS(X). Let A = J∩m(P). Then dH(J,m(P)) = m−|A| and A
is a consistent subset of m(P). Suppose that A 6∈MSA(P), then there exists a consistent
subset A′ of m(P) such that |A′|> |A|. But now, any J′ ∈CJS(X) extending A′ is such
that dH(J′,m(P)) ≤ m− |A′| < m− |A| = dH(J,m(P)), which implies that we do not
have dH(J,m(P)) ≤ dH(J′,m(P)) for every J′ ∈ CJS(X). Therefore, dH(J,m(P)) ≤
dH(J′,m(P)) for every J′ ∈CJS(X) implies that J∩m(P) ∈MSA(P). This implies that
TRMCSA(P) |= TEndpoint(P). 
3.2 Rules based on the weighted majoritarian judgment set
We first define the weighted majoritarian judgment set of a profile P as
w(P) = {〈ϕ,N(P,ϕ)〉,ϕ ∈ X}
where N(P,ϕ) = #{i,ϕ ∈ Ai}.
Whereas m(P) keeps only the information about which one, of the two propositions
ϕ and ¬ϕ, is supported by a majority of voters, w(P) keeps much more information,
since it stores the number of voters who support ϕ and ¬ϕ. Obviously, m(P) can be
recovered from w(P) but not vice versa.
Definition 11 (rule based on the weighted majoritarian judgment set)
A rule R is based on the weighted majoritarian judgment set if there exists a func-
tion f mapping every judgment set (consistent or not) to a nonempty set of consistent
judgment sets, such that for every profile P, R(P) = f (w(P)).
This family can be viewed as the counterpart, for judgment aggregation, of voting
rules that are based on the weighted pairwise majority graph, such as maximin, ranked
pairs, or Borda.
The first rule of this class we consider is the maxweight subagenda rule.
RMSA and RMCSA consider the judgments on the agenda subset as a unit that is to be
kept in its entirety or got ridden of. A finer way of defining a judgment rule consists in
looking for maximal or maxcard majority-consistent subsets of the set of elementary
pieces of information consisting each of a pair (element of the agenda, judgment on
it elicited from an agent). Equivalently, this comes down to weight each element of
the agenda by the number of agents who support it, and then to look for maxweight
subagendas.
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Definition 12 (maxweight subagenda rule RMWA)
For any subagenda Y ⊆ X, the weight of Y with respect to P is defined by wP(Y ) =
∑ψ∈Y N(P,ψ). Let MWA(P) be the set of all consistent subagendas Y of X maximizing
wP. The maxweight subagenda judgment aggregation rule RMWA maps P to RMWA(P)=
{Y | Y ∈MWA(P)}.
Example 4 Consider the agenda and profile of Example 1. We obtain:
N(P, p∧ r) = 10, N(P,¬(p∧ r)) = 7
N(P, p∧ s) = 10, N(P,¬(p∧ s)) = 7
N(P,q) = 13, N(P,¬q) = 4
N(P, p∧q) = 6, N(P,¬(p∧q)) = 11
N(P, t) = 10, N(P,¬t) = 7
Consequently RMWA(P) = {{p∧r, p∧s,q, p∧q, t}}, because wP({p∧r, p∧s,q, p∧
q, t}) = 49 is maximal with respect to all other complete and consistent Y ⊂ X.
The intuition behind this rule is that we look for a minimal number of elementary
information items to remove from P so that it becomes majority-consistent, where an
information item is an element from X approved by an agent. The set of information
items associated with P, denoted by Σ(P), is the multiset containing as many occur-
rences of ϕ as agents who approve ϕ in P. For instance, if [X ] = {a,b,c,a∧ b} and
P = 〈{a,b,c,a∧ b},{¬a,b,c,¬(a∧ b)},{a,¬b,c,¬(a∧ b)}〉 then Σ(P) = {a,b,c,a∧
b,¬a,b,c,¬(a∧b),a,¬b,c,¬(a∧b)}= {a,a,¬a,b,b,¬b,c,c,c,a∧b,¬(a∧b),¬(a∧
b)}.
Now, let MaxCard(Σ(P)) be the set of all maxcard consistent subsets of Σ(P). If
S ∈ MaxCard(Σ(P)) then for every ϕ ∈ X , S contains either all occurrences of ϕ in
Σ(P) or all occurrences of ¬ϕ in Σ(P). Let JS be the judgment set containing ϕ if S
contains all occurrences of ϕ in Σ(P) and ¬ϕ if S contains all occurrences of ¬ϕ in
Σ(P). Then RMWA(P) = {JS |MaxCard(Σ(P))}.
Although it looks entirely new, we will show soon that this natural rule corresponds
to a rule already defined, in a totally different way, in [14].See Section 3.4.
Proposition 4 RMWA is majority-preserving.
Proof: Let P be a majority-consistent profile. We claim that RMWA(P) consists of
all complete consistent subagendas extending m(P)4 Let J be a complete consistent
subagendas extending m(P). Assume that J 6∈ RMWA(P): then there exists a consistent
subagenda J′ such that wP(J′) > wP(J). This implies that there must be a ϕ ∈ X such
that ϕ ∈ J, ¬ϕ ∈ J′, and N(P,¬ϕ) > N(P,ϕ), which implies that ϕ 6∈ m(P), which
contradicts the assumption that J extends m(P). 
The following rule is inspired from the ranked pairs rules in voting theory [31]. It
consists in fixing first the truth value for the elements of the agenda with the largest
4Note that when n is odd, then m(P) is a complete subagenda, so in this case RMWA(P) = {m(P)}; how-
ever, if n is even then m(P)might be incomplete. For instance, if n= 2, [X ] = {p,q} and P= 〈{p,q},{p,¬q}〉
then m(P) = {p} and RMWA(P) = {{p,q},{p,¬q}}.
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majority, and iterate, considering the elements of the agenda in the decreasing order of
the number of agents who support them, and fix their value to the majoritarian value as
long as this is possible without producing an inconsistency.
Definition 13 (ranked agenda RRA)
Let Y = {ϕ ∈ X |N(P,ϕ) > n2}, and let ≥P the complete weak order relation on Y
defined by ϕ P ψ if N(P,ϕ) ≥ N(P,ψ). RRA(P) is defined as follows: A ∈ RRA(P) if
there exists a linear order  on X refining ≥ such that RA(,P) = A, where RA(,P)
is defined inductively by
• reorder the elements of Y following , i.e., such that ϕσ(1)  . . .ϕσ(m);
• D := /0;
• for k := 1 to m do: if D∪{ϕσ(i)} is consistent then D := D∪{ϕσ(i)};
• RA(,P) := D.
Clearly, RRA is based on the weighted majoritarian judgment set.
Example 5 Take again the same profile as in Example 1. We have Y = {p∧ r, p∧
s,q,¬(p∧ q), t}, and q >P ¬(p∧ q) >P p∧ r ∼P p∧ s ∼P t (where ∼P and >P are
respectively the indifference and the strict preference relations induced from P). We
obtain
RRA(P) = {{q,¬(p∧q), t,¬(p∧ r),¬(p∧ s)}}.
We note that every judgment set J in RRA(P) is complete; if not, there would be a
ϕ ∈ X such that neither ϕ not ¬ϕ is in J; now, since J is consistent, either J ∪{ϕ} or
J ∪{¬ϕ} is consistent. But then, either ϕ or ¬ϕ would have been incorporated in J,
which contradicts the assumption that J contains neither ϕ nor ¬ϕ. (More generally,
when the number of voters n is odd, each of the collective judgment sets obtained from
any of the rules introduced so far is equivalent to a complete judgment set.)
Proposition 5 RRA is majority-preserving.
Proof: In , the elements of m(P) are considered before the elements of X \m(P).
Therefore, when an element ϕ of m(P) is considered, the current judgment set D is a
subset of m(P) and D∪{ϕ} ⊆ m(P), therefore D∪{ϕ} is consistent, which implies
that ϕ is incorporated into D. Since this is true for any ϕ ∈ X , we get that any element
of RRA(P) contains m(P).
Now, let J be a consistent, complete extension of m(P). Take  such that all ele-
ments of m(P) are considered first, then all elements of J \{m(P}, then all elements of
X \ J. This order refines P, because if ϕ ∈ Pm(P) then N(P,ϕ)> n2 , if ϕ ∈ J \{m(P}
then N(P,ϕ) = n2 and if ϕ∈ X \J then N(P,ϕ)≤ n2 . Lastly, RA(,P) = J, which proves
that J ∈ RRA(P). 
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3.3 Rules based on the removal or change of individual judgments
The principle at work, for this family, is that we look for a modified profile, as close as
possible to the original profile (with respect to a given distance), such that the resulting
profile is majority-consistent. Different rules will be obtained with different distance
functions.
This family can be viewed as the counterpart, for judgment aggregation, of voting
rules that are based on performing minimal operations on profiles so as to obtain a pro-
file for which there is a Condorcet winner, such as, typically, the Young and Dodgson
rules. (See [13] for a general family of voting rules of that kind).
Unsurprisingly, the first rule we consider is called the Young rule for judgment
aggregation, by analogy with the Young rule in voting, which outputs the candidate
x minimizing the number of voters to remove from the profile so that x becomes a
Condorcet winner.
Definition 14 (Young rule for judgment aggregation RY )
Given a profile P = 〈A1, . . . ,An〉 and a subset of agents J ⊆ {1, . . . ,n}, the restric-
tion of P to J is PJ = 〈A j, j ∈ J〉, and is called a subprofile of P. Let MSP(P) be the set
of maxcard majority-consistent subprofiles of P for which M(PJ) is a complete judg-
ment set. Then the Young judgment aggregation rule Y maps P to RY (P) = {m(PJ) |
PJ ∈MSP(P)}.
Intuitively, this rule consists in removing a minimal number of agents so that the
profile becomes majority-consistent. Or, equivalently, we maximize the number of
voters we keep of a given profile. Obviously, if the profile P is majority-consistent, then
no voter needs to be removed and Y (P) = {m(P)}, hence Y is majority-preserving.
Example 6 Once again we consider P for X given in Example 1. The result
RY (P) = {{¬(p∧ r),¬(p∧ s),q,¬(p∧q)}}
is obtained by removing 3 of the judgment sets {p∧ r, p∧ s,q,(p∧ q), t}. Removing
less, or other 3 judgment sets, does not lead to a majority-consistent profile.
Instead of looking for a minimal number of individual judgments to remove, we
can look for a minimal set of individual judgments to remove, leading to an inclusion-
based version RIY of the Young judgment aggregation rule. RIY is obviously majority-
preserving, for the same reason as RY . Another possibility consists in enlarge-ing the
profile (instead of reducing it) by duplicating a minimal number of judgment sets in
it so as to make it majority-consistent; we get a rule that we call the reversed Young
judgment aggregation rule RRY ; it is also obviously majority-preserving.
The last rule we define does not remove agenda elements and/or voters, but looks
for a minimal number of atomic changes in the profile so that P becomes majority-
consistent, where an atomic change is the change of truth value of one element of the
preagenda in an individual judgment set. For instance, if A1 = {p,q, p∧ q,r, p∧ r},
then A′1 = {¬p,q,¬(p∧q),r,¬(p∧ r)} is obtained from A1 by a series of three atomic
changes (change in the truth value of p, of p∧q and of p∧ r).
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Voters p∧ r p∧ s q p∧q t
6× + + + + +
4× + + − − +
3× − − + + −
4× − − + − −
m(Q) + + + + +
Table 2: The profile Q.
This rule is, in spirit, close to Dodgson’s voting rule, which looks for the smallest
number of elementary changes in a profile so as to make it possess a Condorcet winner.
Replacing having a Condorcet winner by being majority-consistent and adapting the
notion of elementary change, we get our judgment aggregation rule.
Definition 15 (minimal number of atomic changes rule RMNAC) Given a profile P, a
profile Q consisting of complete and consistent individual judgment sets is a closest
majority-consistent profile to P if Q is majority-consistent, and there is no majority-
consistent profile Q′ such that DH(P,Q′)< DH(P,Q). Let CMC(P) the set of all closest
majority-consistent profile to P. The minimal number of atomic changes rule is defined
by
RMNAC(P) = {m(Q) | Q ∈CMC(P)}
RMNAC is not a new rule. Full, one of the four methods introduced by Miller and
Osherson [25], looks for the closest profile of individual judgments that yields a con-
sistent proposition-wise majority output, and then take this output. Therefore, RMNAC
corresponds to the Full voting rule together with the choice of the Hamming distance
(while Miller and Osherson do not commit to a specific distance metric)5
Example 7 Consider the profile P from Example 1. The profile Q given on Table 2 is
the closest majority-consistent profile to P with D(P,Q) = 3.
We obtain RMNAC(P) = {p∧ r, p∧ s,q, p∧q, t}.
Clearly, if P is majority-consistent then no elementary change is needed, therefore
RMNAC is majority-preserving.
Now, RMNAC is not a new rule. Full, one of the four methods introduced by Miller
and Osherson [25], looks for the closest profile of individual judgments that yields a
consistent proposition-wise majority output, and then take this output. The difference
between our minimal number of atomic changes rule and Full is that we use to Ham-
ming distance, while Miller and Osherson do not commit to a specific distance metric.
Of course, we could also look for the closest profiles Q with respect to set inclusion.
But this would give a very weak rule R where ϕ belongs to some judgment set of R(P)
as soon as one individual judgment contains ϕ.
5Another possible choice would consist in allowing the modified profile to be individually inconsistent,
leading to the so-called Output rule in [25].
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3.4 Distance-based rules
Two classes of distance-based rules have been used in judgment aggregation, the first
one characterised by the minimization of distances between judgment sets [29, 14, 25],
derived from distance-based merging operators for belief bases [17, 16], and the second
one characterised by the minimization of distances between profiles [25]. The rules
we consider in this section resort to some kind of minimization of distances between
judgment sets. On the other hand, the minimal number of atomic changes rule (RMNAC)
that we introduced in the previous section is in the spirit of the minimally changing a
profile in order to obtain a majority-consistent collective judgment set as in [25].
In [25] four distance-based rules for judgment aggregation are proposed. We have
already discussed three of them, namely Full, Output and Endpoint. The fourth one,
Prototype, is defined as follows.
Definition 16 Prototyped(A1, . . . ,An) is the set of all judgment sets A in CJS(X)
such that ∑ni=1 d(A,Ai)≤ ∑ni=1 d(A′,Ai),∀A′ ∈Φx}.
This rule has also been considered independently in [14].
We now propose a larger family of aggregation rule, in the same sprit as [25].
Let d :ΦX ×ΦX 7→R+ be a distance function between judgment sets from ΦX and
 : (R+)n 7→ R+ be a symmetric, non-decreasing aggregation function such that, for
every x, y, x1, . . . ,xn ∈ R, has the following properties: (x, . . . ,x)= x;(x1, . . . ,xn)=
0 if and only if x1 = . . .= xn = 0.
The distance-based judgment aggregation rule Rd, induced by d and  is defined
by:
Rd,(A1, . . . ,An) = argmin
A∈ΦX
(d(A,A1), . . .d(A,An)).
Definition 17 A judgment aggregation rule is distance-based if it is equal to Rd, for
some d and .
Here we consider only  = ∑ and  = max, and the Hamming distance dH 6 on
complete judgment sets, defined as
dH(A,A′) = |A\A′|+ |A′ \A|.
In the case when = ∑ we obtain the distance-based procedure of [14].
We choose RdH ,∑ and RdH ,max because they capture respectively the intuition of a
majoritarian operator and of compromise between the individuals’ judgments [3, 18].
Whereas the minimization of the sum of the distances is equivalent to propositionwise
majority voting, the minimization of the maximum distance minimizes the disagree-
ment with the least satisfied individual, hence guaranteeing some degree of compro-
mise.
The first result shows that RdH ,∑ and RMWA are equivalent.
6We could also consider the “drastic distance” dD, defined as dD(A,A′) = 0 if and only if A = A′ and
dD(A,A′) = 1 otherwise. Taking d = dD and  = Σ leads to a judgment aggregation rule that selects the
judgment sets given by the highest number of agents, while taking  = max also leads to a rule of no
interest.
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Proposition 6 RdH ,∑ and RMWA are classically equivalent.
Proof: Given two complete judgment sets A and A′, and ϕ∈ X , define h(ϕ,A,A′) =
1 if ϕ ∈ (A\A′)∪ (A′ \A) and h(ϕ,A,A′) = 0 otherwise.
Now, for any profile P = 〈A1, . . . ,An〉 and any complete judgment set A, we have
∑ni=1 dH(A,Ai)
= ∑ni=1∑ϕ∈X h(ϕ,A,Ai)
= ∑ni=1
(
∑ϕ∈A h(ϕ,A,Ai)+∑ϕ6∈A h(ϕ,A,Ai)
)
= ∑ni=1
(
∑ϕ∈A h(ϕ,A,Ai)+∑¬ϕ∈A h(ϕ,A,Ai)
)
= ∑ni=1
(
∑ϕ∈A h(ϕ,A,Ai)+∑ϕ∈A h(¬ϕ,A,Ai)
)
= ∑ϕ∈A (∑ni=1 h(ϕ,A,Ai)+∑
n
i=1 h(¬ϕ,A,Ai))
= ∑ϕ∈A (n−N(P,ϕ)+N(P,¬ϕ))
= ∑ϕ∈A 2(n−N(P,ϕ))
= 2n∗ |A|−2wP(A)
Therefore, ∑ni=1 dH(A,Ai) is minimum if and only if A ∈MWA(P), that is, wP(A)
is maximum. Since every element of MWA(P) is a complete judgment set, MWA(P) is
equal to the set of all complete judgment sets minimizing ∑ni=1 dH(A,Ai), which allows
us to conclude that RdH ,∑ and RWMA are equivalent.

Comparing the Definition 17 and the definition Prototyped , as it was indicated in
[25], we observe that for all profiles P, RdH ,Σ(P) = PrototypedH (P). Consequently
also, for all profiles P, RMWA(P) = PrototypedH (P).
As a consequence, RdD,∑ is majority-preserving. This is however not the case for
RdD,max, which is the only one of our rules failing to satisfy majority-preservation.
Proposition 7 RdH ,max is not majority-preserving.
Proof: Consider the agenda X = {a,¬a,b,¬b} and P = 〈{a,b},{a,b},{¬a,¬b}〉.
Then RdH ,max(P) = {{a,¬b},{¬a,b}}; however, P is majority-consistent and M(P) =
{{a,b}}.

Example 8 Consider the profile P for agenda X of Example 1. We obtain that RdH ,Σ =
{{p∧ r, p∧ s,q, p∧q, t}} while
RdH ,max(P) =

{¬(p∧ r), ¬(p∧ s), q, ¬(p∧q), t},
{¬(p∧ r), p∧ s, ¬q, ¬(p∧q), t},
{¬(p∧ r), p∧ s, q, p∧q, t},
{p∧ r, ¬(p∧ s), ¬q, ¬(p∧q), t},
{p∧ r, ¬(p∧ s), q, p∧q, t},
{p∧ r, p∧ s, ¬q, ¬(p∧q), ¬t},
{p∧ r, p∧ s, ¬q, p∧q, ¬t}

.
The full calcuations are presented in Table 3.
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Ai {p∧ r, p∧ s, q, p∧q, t} dH(A,A20) dH(Ai,A18) dH(Ai,A3) ∑ max
A1 - - - - - 5 3 1 49 5
A2 - - - - + 4 2 2 46 4
A3 - - + - - 4 4 0 40 4
A4 - - + - + 3 3 1 37 3
A5 - - + + - 3 5 1 45 5
A6 - - + + + 2 4 2 42 4
A7 - + - - - 4 2 2 46 4
A8 - - + + + 2 4 2 42 4
A9 - + - - - 4 2 2 46 4
A10 - + - - + 3 1 3 43 3
A11 - + + + - 2 4 2 42 4
A12 - + + + + 1 3 3 39 3
A13 + - - - - 4 2 2 46 4
A14 + - - - + 3 1 3 43 3
A15 + - + + - 2 4 2 42 4
A16 + - + + + 1 3 3 39 3
A17 + + - - - 3 1 3 42 3
A18 + + - - + 2 0 4 40 4
A19 + + + + - 1 3 3 39 3
A20 + + + + + 0 2 4 36 4
Table 3: The calculations for RdH ,Σ(P) and RdH ,max(P). Recall that ∑ni= j d(Ai,A j) =
6dH(Ai,A20)+4dH(Ai,A18)+7dH(Ai,A3)
4 (Non)inclusion relationships between the rules
In this section we consider the equality and inclusion relationships between the rules
we have introduced.
Proposition 8 We have the following diagram (Table 7), where inc means “inclusion-
wise incomparable”, ⊂ means that TR1(P)⊂ TR2(P) , for all profiles P where R1 is the
row rule and R2 is the column rule, correspondingly for ⊃. The number next to inc or
⊂ denotes the proposition in which the relationship is proved.
RMCSA RMWA RRA RY RMNAC RdH ,max
RMSA ⊂, 9 ⊂, 10 ⊂, 11 inc,13 inc, 20 inc, 12
RMCSA inc,14 inc,15 inc,13 inc,19 inc,12
RMWA inc,18 inc,16 inc,21 inc,12
RRA inc,17 inc,21 inc,12
RY inc,21 inc,12
RMNAC inc,12
Table 4: A summary of the (non)inclusion relationships between the proposed rules.
We give proofs for each table entry, left to right, top to bottom.
Proposition 9 For all profiles P, TRMSA(P)⊂ TRMCSA(P).
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Proof: If Y ⊂ [X ] is a maxcard consistent sub-preagenda (w.r.t. P) of [X ] then it is also
a maximal consistent sub-preagenda (w.r.t. P). Now, if α∈ TRMSA(P), then α is inferred
in every maximal consistent sub-preagenda, and a fortiori in every maxcard consistent
sub-preagenda, therefore α ∈ TRMCSA(P).
To show that TRMCSA(P) 6⊆ TRMSA(P), consider the profile P in Example 1. As it can
be observed in Example 3, TRMCSA(P) |= p∧ r, but we can observe from Example 2 that
TRMSA(P) 2 p∧ r. 
Proposition 10 For all profiles P, TRMSA(P)⊂ TRMWA(P).
Proof: If Y ⊂ [X ] is a consistent sub-preagenda maximizing wP(Y ), then m(P↓Y ) is a
maximal consistent subagenda (w.r.t. P). Now, if α ∈ TRMSA(P), then α is inferred in
every maximal consistent sub-preagenda, and a fortiori in every maxweight consistent
subagenda, therefore α ∈ TRMWA(P).
To show that TRMWA(P) 6⊆ TRMSA(P), consider the profile P in Example 1. As it can
be observed in Example 4, TRMWA(P) |= q, but we can observe from Example 2 that
TRMSA(P) 2 q.

Proposition 11 For all profiles P, TRMSA(P)⊂ TRRA(P).
Proof: In the construction of RRA(P), let Z be the subset of X composed of the ψk
such that δ∧ψk is consistent. Z is a maximal consistent subagenda w.r.t. P (it is
consistent by construction, and maximal because every time a formula ψk is rejected, it
is because it produces an inconsistency with the formulas already present in δ). Now, if
α ∈ TRMSA(P), then α is inferred in every maximal consistent subagenda, and a fortiori
in Z, therefore α ∈ TRRA(P).
To show that TRRA(P) 6⊆ TRMSA(P), consider the profile P in Example 1. As it can
be observed in Example 5, TRRA(P) |= q, but we can observe from Example 2 that
TRMSA(P) 2 q. 
Proposition 12 RdH ,max is incomparable with all the other rules.
Proof: Let R be a majority-preserving rule. Take the profile P as in the proof of
Proposition 7. Then a↔¬b ∈ TRdH ,max(P), whereas a↔¬b 6∈ TR(P) (since a↔ b ∈
TR(P)); and a ∈ TR(P), whereas a 6∈ TRdH ,max(P). Therefore, RdH ,max is incomparable
with all of the other rules. 
Proposition 13 RY is incomparable with RMSA and RMCSA.
Proof: Consider the profile P on Table 5, with pre-agenda [X ] = {a,a→ (b∨c),b,c,a→
(d∨e),d,e}, and three agents with the following information sets: The majoritarian ag-
gregation obtained from this profile is B= {a,a→ (b∨c),¬b,¬c,a→ (d∨e),¬d,¬e}.
The minimal inconsistent subsets of B are {a,a → (b ∨ c),b,c} and {a,a → (d ∨
e),d,e}, therefore, there B has 10 maximal consistent subsets: 9 containing a, two
of the three formulas {a→ (b∨ c),¬b,¬c} and two of the three formulas {a→ (d ∨
e),¬d,¬e}, and one equal to B\{a}. These 10 maximal consistent subsets correspond
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a a→ (b∨ c) b c a→ (d∨ e) d e
+ + + − + + −
+ + − + + − +
+ − − − − − −
Table 5: The profile P.
to 10 maximal subagendas; the only maxcard consistent subagenda is B \ {a}, and in
this subagenda of B, ¬a is inferred. Therefore, TRMCSA(P) |= ¬a. Now, all sub-profiles
of P of size two is majority-consistent, and each of them accepts a, therefore TRY (P) |=
a. Therefore, RY and RMCSA are incomparable. For TRY (P) 6⊆ TRMSA(P), take the same
profile as above and note that a ∈ TRY (P) but a 6∈ TRMSA(P). For TRMSA(P) 6⊆ TRY (P),
assume the pre-agenda is extended with another agenda item f , on which the agents
vote +, +, -. We have f ∈ TRMSA but f 6∈ TRY . 
Proposition 14 RMWA is incomparable with RMCSA.
Proof: Take the following seven agent profile P:
a b a∧b
3× + + +
2× + − −
2× − + −
We obtain that RMWA(P)= {{a,b,a∧b}}, while RMCSA(P)= {{a,b},{a,¬a∨¬b},{b,¬a∨
¬b}}. Thus a ∈ TRMWA(P) whereas a 6∈ TRMCSA(P). For the converse, in the example of
Proposition 13, we have ¬a 6∈ TRMWA(P) and ¬a ∈ TRMCSA(P). 
Proposition 15 RRA is incomparable with RMCSA.
Proof: Same profile P as in Proposition 13. We have that TRRA(P) |= a. Hence a ∈
TRRA(P) whereas ¬a ∈ RMCSA(P), see Proposition 13. 
Proposition 16 RMWA is incomparable with RY .
Proof: Consider the following pre-agenda
[X ] = {a,a→ p1,a→ q1,a→ (p1 ∧ q1),a→ p2,a→ q2,a→ (p2 ∧ q2),a→ p3,a→
q3,a→ (p3∧q3),a→ p4,a→ q4,a→ (p4∧q4)}.
Let the profile P be as given on Table 6.
We obtain that RMWA(P) = {{¬a,a→ p1,a→ q1,¬(a→ (p1 ∧ q1)),a→ p2,a→
q2,¬(a→ (p2∧q2)),a→ p3,a→ q3,¬(a→ (p3∧q3)),a→ p4,a→ q4,¬(a→ (p4∧
q4))}}. Hence TRMWA(P) |= ¬a.
The result for RY (P) is obtained when exactly one, either one, of the voters is
removed. For RY (P) we obtain TRY (P) |= a. 
Proposition 17 RRA is incomparable with RY .
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Voters
Agenda ×1 ×1 ×1 m(P) N(P,ϕi)
a + + + + 3
a→ p1 + + - + 2
a→ q1 + - + + 2
a→ (p1∧q1) + - - - 1
a→ p2 + + - + 2
a→ q2 + - + + 2
a→ (p2∧q2) + - - - 1
a→ p3 + + - + 2
a→ q3 + - + + 2
a→ (p3∧q3) + - - - 1
a→ p4 + + - + 2
a→ q4 + - + + 2
a→ (p4∧q4) + - - - 1
Table 6: The profile P. The judgment sets are the second, third and fourth column of
the table.
Proof: We do not have TRRA(P) ⊆ TRY (P) as a consequence of Proposition 11 and 13.
For the converse, consider the following profile P, with pre-agenda [X ] = {p,q, p∧
q,r,s,r∧ s, t} and 18 agents into six different groups:
p q p∧q r s r∧ s t
1× + + + − + − +
3× + + + − + − −
4× + + + + − − −
2× + − − + − − −
4× + − − + + + +
4× − + − + + + +
We easily check that the minimal number of agents to remove so as to make the profile
majority-consistent is two, and that these agents are the two agents of the fourth group.
Therefore, t ∈ TRY (P), whereas t 6∈ TRRA(P). 
Proposition 18 RRA is incomparable with RMWA.
Proof: Same profile as in Proposition 16. We have φ13 ∈ TRRA(P), whereas ¬φ13 ∈
TRMWA(P). 
Proposition 19 RMNAC is incomparable with RMCSA.
Proof:To show that there exists a profile P such that TRMCSA(P) 6⊂ TRMNAC , consider the
pre-agenda and profile in the proof of Proposition 13 in which we have that TRMCSA(P) |=
¬a. There are 23 profiles Q at a minimal distance D(P,Q) = 2. We obtain TRMNAC(P) 2
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Voters p q p∧q p∧¬q α1 α2 q∧¬p α3 α4
1 × + + + - - - - - -
1 × + - - + + + - - -
1 × - + - - - - + + +
m(P) + + - - - - - - -
Table 7: The profile P, counterexample for TRMSA(P) 6⊆ TRMNAC(P).
¬a because
RMNAC(P) = { {a,a→ (b∨ c),¬b,c,a→ (d∨ e),¬d,e},
{a,a→ (b∨ c),¬b,c,a→ (d∨ e),d,¬e},
{a,a→ (b∨ c),b,¬c,a→ (d∨ e),¬d,e},
{a,a→ (b∨ c),b,¬c,a→ (d∨ e),d,¬e},
{a,¬(a→ (b∨ c)),¬b,¬c,¬(a→ (d∨ e)),¬d,¬e}
{¬a,a→ (b∨ c),¬b,¬c,a→ (d∨ e),¬d,¬e}}.
To show that that there exists a profile P such that TRMNAC 6⊂ TRMCSA(P), consider the
profile P from Example 1. We have TRMNAC(P) |= q, see Example 7, but TRMCSA(P) 2 q,
see Example 3. 
Proposition 20 RMNAC is incomparable with RMSA.
Proof: To show that there exists a P such that TRMSA(P) 6⊆ TRMNAC(P), consider the
pre-agenda [X ] = {p,q, p∧q, p∧¬q,α1,α2,q∧¬p,α3,α4}, where α1 = p∧¬q∧¬q,
α2 = p∧¬q∧¬q∧¬q α3 = q∧¬p∧¬p and α4 = q∧¬p∧¬p∧¬p. A profile for this
pre-agenda is given in Table 7
We obtain RMSA(P)= {{q,¬(p∧q),¬(p∧¬q),¬α1,¬α2,¬(q∧¬p),¬α3,¬α4},{p,¬(p∧
q),¬(p∧¬q),¬α1,¬α2,¬(q∧¬p),¬α3,¬α4},{¬(p∧q),¬(p∧¬q),¬α1,¬α2,¬(q∧
¬p),¬α3,¬α4}}. Consequently TRMSA(P) |= p∨q.
To obtain RMNAC(P), we need to change the first three judgments of the first voter,
obtaining the profile given in Table 7. This is the minimal change, since if either the
second or the third agent change either their judgment on p or their judgment on q, they
have to change additional other three judgments. Hence we obtain
RMNAC(P) = {¬p,¬q,¬(p∧ q),¬(p∧¬q),¬α1,¬α2,¬(q∧¬p),¬α3,¬α4}. We ob-
serve that TRMNAC(P) 2 p∨q.
To show that there exists a P such that TRMNAC(P) 6⊆ TRMSA(P), consider the profile
P from Example 1. We have TRMNAC(P) |= q, see Example 7, but TRMSA(P) 2 q, see
Example 2.
Proposition 21 RMNAC is incomparable with RY , RRA, and RMWA.
Proof: Consider the pre-agenda [X ] = {p,q, p∧q} and the following profile:
We obtain that ¬(p∧q) ∈ TRMNAC(P), since RMNAC(P) = m(P′)∪m(P′′), where P′
and P′′ are as in Tables 9 and 10.
On the other hand, we obtain:
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Voters p q p∧q p∧¬q α1 α2 q∧¬p α3 α4
1 × - - - - - - - - -
1 × + - - + + + - - -
1 × - + - - - - + + +
m(P) - - - - - - - - -
Table 8: After changing the first three judgments of the first agent.
Voters p q p∧q r s r∧ s t
1× + + + − + − +
3× + + + − + − −
4× + + + + − − −
2× + − − + − − −
4× + − − + + + +
4× − + − + + + +
Voters p q p∧q
1× + + +
1× - - -
1× - + -
m(P) - + -
Table 9: The profile P′.
Voters p q p∧q
1× + + +
1× + - -
1× - - -
m(P) + - -
Table 10: P′′.
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• RY = {{p},{q},{¬(p∧q)}},
• RRA = {{p,¬q,¬(p∧q)},{p,¬q,¬(p∧q)},{p,q, p∧q}},
• RMWA = {{p,¬q,¬(p∧q)},{p,¬q,¬(p∧q)},{p,q, p∧q}}.
Consequently TRMNAC(P) 6⊂ TRZ (P) for Z ∈ {Y,RA,MWA}.
To show that TRY (P) 6⊂ TRMNAC(P) consider the profile P from Example 1. As it can
be observed from Example 7, TRMNAC(P) |= p∧ r, but we can observe in Example 6
that for this profile TRY (P) |= ¬(p∧ r). Furthermore, we can observe in Example 5 that
TRRA(P) |= ¬(p∧ r).
To show that TRMWA(P) 6⊂ TRMNAC(P), consider again the pre-agenda of the proof of
Proposition 20 and its corresponding profile P given on Table 7. For this profile we get
that RMWA(P) = {p,q, p∧q,¬(p∧¬q),¬α1,¬α2,¬(q∧¬p),¬α3,¬α4}, since for this
judgment set the weight is 17, and for the remaining three other possible judgment sets
the weights are: 14 for the set of the judgment sets of the second, and third agent and
16 for the judgment set {¬p,¬q,¬(p∧q),¬(p∧¬q),¬α1,¬α2,¬(q∧¬p),¬α3,¬α4}.
Consequently, TRMWA |= p∨q. In the proof of Proposition 20 we show that TRMNAC(P) 2
p∨q for this profile. 

Gathering all results, we get the diagram.
5 Desirable properties for judgment aggregation rules
We consider some important social choice-theoretic properties for judgment aggrega-
tion.
5.1 Unanimity
Unanimity is one of the most natural properties in social choice, guaranteeing that if
all agents submit the same individual information to be aggregated then the aggre-
gate is precisely that information. While unanimity is a relatively week property in
voting theory and preference aggregation, satisfied by virtually all rules, in judgment
aggregation, due to the logic relations between agenda issues, unanimity is not self
assumed. The version of unanimity stating that if all agents submit the same judg-
ment set then this judgment set is the aggregate is weak enough to be satisfied by all
judgment aggregation rules we proposed. However, another version can be considered,
the unanimity principle whether the unanimously selected judgment is included in the
collective judgment sets. This is the version considered in the judgment aggregation lit-
erature. Dietrich and List [10] define the unanimity principle for judgment aggregation
functions as follows.
Definition 18 (unanimity principle [10])
For all profiles 〈A1, . . . ,An〉 in the domain of the aggregation function f and all
ϕ ∈ X, if ϕ ∈ Ai for all individuals i, then ϕ ∈ f (A1, . . . ,An).
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Given that we consider nondeterministc rules, we have two versions of the unanim-
ity principle, whether the unanimously approved formula must be in some collective
judgment set (weak unanimity) or in all judgment sets (strong unanimity). Let R be a
judgment aggregation rule.
Definition 19 (weak and strong unanimity)
• R satisfies weak unanimity if for every profile P = 〈A1, . . . ,An〉 and all ϕ ∈ X, if
ϕ ∈ Ai for all i, then there exists a judgment set A ∈ R(P) such that ϕ ∈ A.
• R satisfies strong unanimity if for every profile P = 〈A1, . . . ,An〉 and all ϕ ∈ X, if
ϕ ∈ Ai for all i, then ϕ ∈ TR(P).
It can be directly observed that the strong unanimity property implies weak una-
nimity property.
5.2 Monotonicity
In voting theory monotonicity is a standard property considered for voting rules. When
a voting rule is monotonic, an improvement in the ranking of the winning alternative,
ceteris paribus, does not diminish that alternative’s likelihood of being a winner. When
the purpose of aggregation is to select an alternative that is representative of the indi-
vidual input, then it is desirable that additional support for an input should not make
that input less likely to be the aggregate [28].
In judgment aggregation monotonicity has also been considered as a desirable prop-
erty. There are three versions of monotonicity defined for judgment aggregation func-
tions: monotonicity on an agenda issue as a property imposed on an aggregation func-
tion [24], monotonicity as a property imposed on a subset of the agenda (to address
manipulability issues) [7], and monotonicity on a judgment set by [9]. The first prop-
erty is the strongest, subsuming the other two.
We can define a monotonicity property for judgment aggregation rules following
the property in [24].
Definition 20 (Monotonicity) Let R be a judgment aggregation rule. Let P=(A1, . . . ,Ai, . . . ,An)
be a profile for an agenda X and P′ = (A1, . . . ,A′i, . . . ,An) its i-variant; P ∈ Dom(R)
and P′ ∈ Dom(R). R is monotonic when,
if there is a φ ∈ X such that
– φ 6∈ Ai,
– φ ∈ A′i, and
– φ ∈ TR(P)
then φ ∈ TR(P′) and R(P′) = R(P).
However, this monotonicity is a very strong property, since no constraints are put
on A′i with respect to Ai. Namely, it can happen that A′i ∩Ai = /0 and for rules that do
not satisfy independence, the collective judgment set can be affected on more issues
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than just φ. To this end we can define a weaker monotonicity property and we consider
whether out rules satisfy it. The intuition behind our new property, is closer to the
intuition behind the monotonicity property as studied in voting theory. Namely, the
ceteris paribus improvement in the support for a judgment that is already included in
all collective judgment sets, should not diminish that judgments likelihood of being in
all collective judgment sets. This is the property of insensitivity to reinforcement of
collective judgements of collective judgements.
Definition 21 (insensitivity to reinforcement)
Let P be a profile over X and α ∈ X. P′ is called an α-improvement of P if P′ =
(A′i,A−i) where (a) ¬α ∈ Ai and A′i = (Ai \ {¬α})∪{α}), and (b) A′i is consistent. R
satisfies insensitivity to reinforcement of collective judgements if for all profiles P such
that α ∈ TR(P) and all α-improvements P′ of P, we have R(P′) = R(P).
It can be observed directly that if a rule R is monotonic then it satisfies the insensi-
tivity to reinforcement of collective judgments.
5.3 Separability
In voting theory, the separability property states that if an alternative is a winner, under
a voting rule, for two distinct profiles under the same set of candidates, then that alter-
native is a winner, under the same voting rule, for the profile obtained by combining the
two profiles. The property of separability is defined in [32], also defined as consistency
in [33], and it is sometimes called reinforcement as well. This property is best known
as one of the conditions, together with neutrality and anonymity, used by Young in his
characterization of scoring social choice rules [33]. The voting rules that do not satisfy
the separability property are subject to occurrences of the Simpson’s paradox [1].
In judgment aggregation, the separability property is of interest as well. One rea-
son is that the separability property is a natural requirement to make: if a judgment set
is among the collective judgment sets for profile P1 and for profile P2, then it should
be among the judgment sets for the combined profile P. Another reason can be found
in the problem of implementation of judgment aggregation. Namely if a rule satisfies
the separability property, then the aggregation process can be decentralized in some
cases, separate groups of agents aggregating their profiles and then combining the out-
put, which reduces the amount of information that needs to be exchanged between the
agents.
Definition 22 (separability)
For all profiles P1,P2 ∈Dom(R), with P1 = 〈A1, . . . ,An1〉 and P2 = 〈B1, . . . ,Bn2〉, we
define P1 +P2 as the n1 +n2-profile 〈A1, . . . ,An1 ,B1, . . . ,Bn2〉. Then we say that a rule
R satisfies separability if for every profiles P1,P2 such that α ∈ TR(P1) and α ∈ TR(P2),
then α ∈ TR(P1∪P2).
6 Results
Proposition 22 RMSA satisfies weak unanimity but not strong unanimity.
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Proof: Let P be a profile on an agenda X , and ϕ ∈ X such that all agents in P agree
on ϕ. There exists a maximal consistent agenda containing ϕ, and in this subagenda P
entails ϕ, therefore RMSA satisfies weak unanimity.
Consider the profile P of the proof of Proposition 13 as a counter example. RMSA does
not satisfy strong unanimity, because a 6∈ TRMSA(P).

Proposition 23 RMCSA does not satisfy weak (or strong) unanimity.
Proof: Consider again the profile P of the proof of Proposition 13. The only max-
card consistent subagenda of P contains ¬a (and does not contain a). Consequently
RMCSA does not even satisfy weak unanimity.

Proposition 24 RMWA does not satisfy weak (or strong) unanimity.
Proof: See again the counterexample that can be found in [30], which we presented in
the proof of Proposition 16.

Proposition 25 RRA satisfies strong (and weak) unanimity.
Proof:Let P be a profile and YP ⊆ X be the subset of the agenda consisting of all
elements on which there is unanimity among the agents. Because individual judgment
sets are consistent, the conjunction of all elements of Y is consistent. Now, when
computing RRA(P), the elements of Y are considered first, and whatever the order in
which they are considered, they are included in δ because no inconsistency arises.
Therefore, for all α ∈ YP and all J ∈ RRA(P), we have α ∈ J. 
Proposition 26 RY satisfies strong (and weak) unanimity.
Proof:Observe that if α is unanimously accepted by all agents in the set N, it is
consequently unanimously selected by all consistent subsets of N. 
Proposition 27 RdH ,max does not satisfy weak (or strong) unanimity.
Proof:Consider the pre-agenda
[X ] = {a,b,c,d,(a∧b∧ c∧d)∨ (¬a∧¬b∧¬c∧¬d)︸ ︷︷ ︸
α
},
and the profile P = 〈A1,A2〉 consisting of these two judgment sets: A1 = {a,b,c,d,α}
and A2 = {¬a,¬b,¬c,¬d,α}. The elements of ΦX and their distances to A1 and A2
are given in Table 11. As it can be observed from the table, the RdH ,max(P) selects all
A ∈ ΦX for which max(dH(A,A1),dH(A,A2)) = 3. For all such A it holds that α 6∈ A.
Since α ∈ A1 and α ∈ A2, for this P, RdH ,max does not satisfy the weak unanimity
property. 
Proposition 28 RMNAC does not satisfy weak (nor strong) unanimity.
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A ∈ΦX dH(A,A1) dH(A,A2) max
{a,b,c,d,α} 0 4 4
{a,b,c,¬d,¬α} 2 4 4
{a,b,¬c,d,¬α} 2 4 4
{a,b,¬c,¬d,¬α} 3 3 3
{a,¬b,c,d,¬α} 2 4 4
{a,¬b,c,¬d,¬α} 3 3 3
{a,¬b,¬c,d,¬α} 3 3 3
{a,¬b,¬c,¬d,¬α} 4 2 4
{¬a,b,c,d,¬α} 2 4 4
{¬a,b,c,¬d,¬α} 3 3 3
{¬a,b,¬c,d,¬α} 3 3 3
{¬a,b,¬c,¬d,¬α} 4 2 4
{¬a,¬b,c,d,¬α} 3 3 3
{¬a,¬b,c,¬d,¬α} 4 2 4
{¬a,¬b,¬c,d,¬α} 4 2 4
{¬a,¬b,¬c,¬d,α} 4 0 4
Table 11: The max of Hamming distances from an element in the set ΦX to each of the
agent’s judgment sets.
Proof: Again consider the agenda and profile P in the proof of Proposition 16. Since
RMNAC(P) = RMWA(P), this example of a profile is a counter example for RMNAC satis-
fying weak unanimity as well. 
Proposition 29 RMSA, RMCSA, RMWA and RRA are insensitive to reinforcement of col-
lective judgements.
Proof:
1. We consider RMSA. Assume that α ∈ TRMSA(P). Let X ′ ⊆ X be a maximal agenda
for which P↓X ′ is majority-consistent. Because α ∈ TRMSA(P), we must have
α ∈ X ′. Obviously, P′↓X ′ is majority-consistent as well and moreover m(P′↓X ′) =
m(P↓X ′) (1). Moreover, it entails that all maximal majority-consistent subagenda
for P′ contain some maximal majority-consistent subagenda for P′ (2). Now,
let X ′ ⊆ X be a maximal agenda for which P′↓X ′ is majority-consistent. If α 6∈
m(P′↓X ′) then a fortiori α 6∈ m(P↓X ′), which contradicts (2). Therefore, α ∈
m(P′↓X ′), and because of (2), it is also a maximal majority-consistent subagenda
for P. We have shown that the maximal majority-consistent subagendas for P and
P′ coincide, therefore RMSA(P) = RMCSA(P′). The proof for RMCSA is similar.
2. Now, we consider RRA. Let α ∈ X and assume that α ∈ TRRA(P). Then all
subagendas in RRA(P) contains α. Let P′ be an α-improvement of P. Then
N(P′,α)>N(P,α), N(P′,¬α)<N(P,¬α) , whereas for all ϕ 6=α,¬α, N(P′,ϕ)=
N(P,ϕ). Note that in ≥P′ , α appears either at an earlier position or in the same
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position as in ≥P. Therefore, if ′ be an order refining ≥P′ , when α is consid-
ered in , it must be consistent with D, otherwise there would be an order 
refining ≥P resulting in a subagenda not containing α. Therefore α belongs to
all subagendas in RA(P′).
3. We consider RMWA i.e., RdH ,∑. Let P be a profile P = (A1, . . . ,Ak, . . . ,An) and its
a α-reinforcement, a profile P′ = (A′1, . . . ,A
′
k, . . . ,A
′
n) = (A1, . . . ,A
∗
k , . . . ,An). Let
ΦX be the set of all consistent and complete judgment sets over an agenda X . Let
us define D(A,P) = ∑ni=1 dH(A,Ai).
We have the following assumptions:
• α 6∈ Ak,
• α ∈ A∗k ,
• for all ψ ∈ X ,ψ 6∈ {α,¬α} it holds ψ ∈ Ak iff ψ ∈ A∗k ,
• α ∈ A, f orallA ∈ RdH ,Σ(P).
We first show that all the judgment sets A ∈ Rdh,Σ(P) are such that A ∈ Rdh,Σ(P′)
and that there exists no A′ ∈ ΦX such that: α ∈ A′, A′ 6∈ Rdh,Σ(P), but A′ ∈
Rdh,Σ(P′).
Let the score of the winner judgment sets A for P be c, namely let c=∑ni=1 dH(A,Ai),
for all A ∈ Rdh,Σ(P). We have that, for all A′ ∈ ΦX , when the cardinality of the
pre-agenda is m:
dH(A′,Ak) = m−|Ak ∩A′|,
dH(A′,A∗k) = m−|A∗k ∩A′|.
Let A′ ∈ΦX be such that α ∈ A′. Since dH(Ak,A∗k) = 1, we have that |Ak ∩A′|−
|A∗k ∩A′|= 1. Hence dH(A′,Ak) = 1+dH(A′,A∗k and
D(A′,P) = 1+D(A′,P′). (1)
For all the winners A for P, we obtain that D(A,P) = 1+D(A,P′), hence
D(A,P′) = c−1. (2)
If an A′ 6∈ Rdh,Σ(P), then D(A′,P) > c and due to 1, D(A′,P′) > c− 1. We can
conclude that there is no A′ ∈ ΦX such that α ∈ A′ and A′ 6∈ Rdh,Σ(P) but A′ ∈
Rdh,Σ(P′).
We now show that there exists no A′′ ∈ ΦX such that α 6∈ A′′ and A′′ 6∈ Rdh,Σ(P)
but A′′ ∈ Rdh,Σ(P′). We construct a proof by contradiction, starting with the
assumption that there exists such a A′′ ∈ Rdh,Σ(P′).
Since A′′ 6∈ Rdh,Σ(P), we obtain
D(A′′,P)> c. (3)
27
Voters p q p∧q r
2× + + + +
2× + - - +
1× + - - +
4× - + - -
m(P) + + - +
Voters p q p∧q r
2× + + + +
2× + - - +
1× - - - +
4× - + - -
m(P) - + - +
Table 12: P on the left, and the ¬p-reinforcement P′ on the right.
Since α ∈ A∗k and α 6∈ A′, we obtain dH(A′′,Ak)< dH(A′′,A∗k) and consequently
D(A′′,P)< D(A′′,P′). (4)
Putting together inequalities 3 and 4 we obtain
D(A′′,P′)> c (5)
However, the inequality 5 and inequality 2 are contradictory with the assump-
tion that A′′ 6∈ Rdh,Σ(P). This completes the proof that Rdh,Σ is insensitive to
reinforcement of collective judgements.

Proposition 30 RY is not insensitive to reinforcement of collective judgements.
Proof:We show that although it holds that it is not the case that RY (P) 6= RY (P′) when
α ∈ TY (P) and P′ is a α-reinforcement of P. We use a proof by counter example. Let
the pre-agenda be [X ] = {p,q, p∧q,r}. Consider the profile P of 9 voters:
Consider the profile P in Table 12. P is not majority-consistent, but removing any
voter who has p in her judgment set suffices to restore consistency, therefore RY (P) =
{q,¬(p∧ q)}. Consider the ¬p-reinforcement profile P′, Table 12 right-most. Now
RY (P′) = {¬p,q,¬(p∧ q),r}. Observe that although ¬p ∈ TY (P) and ¬p ∈ TY (P′),
RY (P) 6=T RY (P′). 
Proposition 31 RdH ,max is not insensitive to reinforcement of collective judgements.
Proof: Consider the pre-agenda [X ] = {p∧ r, p∧q,q, t}, the profile P for three agents:
Voters p∧ r p∧q q t
1× − + − +
1× + − − −
1× − − + +
and its ¬(p∧q)-reinforcement (in the first voter’s judgment set) P′:
voters p∧ r p∧q q t
1 − − − +
2 + − − −
3 − − + +
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As it can be observed from Table 13, ¬(p∧q) ∈ TRdH ,max(P), since
RdH ,max(P) = {{¬(p∧ r),¬(p∧ q),¬q,¬t},{¬(p∧ r),¬(p∧ q),¬q, t},{p∧ r,¬(p∧
q),¬q, t}}. However, as it can be observed from Table 14, RdH ,max(P′) = {{¬(p∧
r),¬(p∧q),¬q,¬t},{¬(p∧r),¬(p∧q),¬q, t},{p∧r,¬(p∧q),¬q, t},{¬(p∧r),¬(p∧
q),q,¬t}}. Thus, ¬(p∧ q) ∈ TRdH ,max(P′), but RdH ,max(P) 6= RdH ,max(P′). Further-
more, since ¬q ∈ TRdH ,max(P) , but ¬q 6∈ TRdH ,max(P′), we obtain that RdH ,max(P) 6=T
RdH ,max(P′).
A ∈ΦX dH(A,A5) dH(A,A8) dH(A,A4) max
A1 {¬(p∧ r),¬(p∧q),¬q,¬t} 2 1 2 2
A2 {¬(p∧ r),¬(p∧q),¬q, t} 1 2 1 2
A3 {¬(p∧ r),¬(p∧q),q,¬t} 3 2 1 3
A4 {¬(p∧ r),¬(p∧q),q, t} 2 3 0 3
A5 {¬(p∧ r), p∧q,¬q, t} 0 3 2 3
A6 {¬(p∧ r), p∧q,q,¬t} 2 3 2 3
A7 {¬(p∧ r), p∧q,q, t} 1 4 1 4
A8 {p∧ r,¬(p∧q),¬q,¬t} 3 0 3 3
A9 {p∧ r,¬(p∧q),¬q, t} 2 1 2 2
A10 {p∧ r, p∧q,q,¬t} 3 2 3 3
A11 {p∧ r, p∧q,q, t} 2 3 2 3
Table 13: The max of Hamming distances from an element in the set ΦX to each of the
agent’s judgment sets in profile P.
A ∈ΦX dH(A,A2) dH(A,A8) dH(A,A4) max
A1 {¬(p∧ r),¬(p∧q),¬q,¬t} 2 1 2 2
A2 {¬(p∧ r),¬(p∧q),¬q, t} 1 2 1 2
A3 {¬(p∧ r),¬(p∧q),q,¬t} 1 2 1 2
A4 {¬(p∧ r),¬(p∧q),q, t} 0 3 0 3
A5 {¬(p∧ r), p∧q,¬q, t} 2 3 2 3
A6 {¬(p∧ r), p∧q,q,¬t} 1 3 2 3
A7 {¬(p∧ r), p∧q,q, t} 1 4 1 4
A8 {p∧ r,¬(p∧q),¬q,¬t} 3 0 3 3
A9 {p∧ r,¬(p∧q),¬q, t} 2 1 2 2
A10 {p∧ r, p∧q,q,¬t} 2 2 3 3
A11 {p∧ r, p∧q,q, t} 1 3 2 3
Table 14: The max of Hamming distances from an element in the set ΦX to each of the
agent’s judgment sets in profile P′.

For the remaining rule, namely RMNAC, we have no result. We conjecture that it is
insensitive to reinforcement of collective judgements.
Lastly, we consider separability. We establish a general result which shows that
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majority-preservation and rule separability are incompatible. This result can be seen as
the judgment aggregation counterpart as the result stating that any Condorcet-consistent
voting rule violates reinforcement, see Theorem 9.2 [pg.237, [27]].
Proposition 32 Any majority-preserving judgment aggregation rule violates separa-
bility.
Proof: Let R be a majority-preserving rule, and assume furthermore that R satisfies
separability. Let [X ] = {p,q, p∨q}, and P the 10-voter profile as follows:
voters p q p∨q
1,2 + + +
3,4 − + +
5,6 + − +
7,8,9,10 − − −
Consider the two subprofiles P1 consisting of voters {1,3,4,7,8} and P2 consisting
of voters {2,5,6,9,10}. P1 and P2 are majority-consistent, with m(P1) = {¬p,q, p∨
q} and m(P2) = {p,¬q, p ∨ q}. Since R is majority-preserving, we have R(P1) =
{{p,¬q, p∨ q}} and R(P2) = {{q,¬p, p∨ q}}; therefore, p↔¬q ∈ TR(P1) and p↔
¬q ∈ TR(P2), from which, by separability, (1) p↔¬q ∈ TR(P1∪P2) = TR(P).
Consider now the two subprofiles P3 consisting of voters {1,2,3} and P4 consist-
ing of voters 4 to 10. P3 and P4 are majority-consistent, with m(P3) = {p,q, p∧ q}
and m(P4) = {¬p,¬q,¬p∧¬q}. Since R is majority-preserving, we have R(P3) =
{{p,q, p ∧ q}} and R(P4) = {{¬p,¬q,¬p ∧ ¬q}}; therefore, p ↔ q ∈ TR(P3) and
p↔ ¬q ∈ TR(P4), from which, by separability, (3) p↔ q ∈ TR(P1 ∪P2) = TR(P), in
contradiction with (1). 
As a corollary, all our rules except RdH ,max violate separability.
Corollary 1 None of the aggregation rules RY , RMSA, RMCSA, RMWA, RRAand RMNAC
satisfies separability.
The only one of our rules which is not majority-preserving is RdH ,max. However,
this one does not satisfy separability either, which shows that it seems extremely diffi-
cult to find a reasonable judgment aggregation rule that satisfies separability.
Proposition 33 RdH ,max does not satisfy separability.
Proof: Let [X ] = {p,q,r, p→ (q∧ r)}, and the 5-voter profile P:
voters p q r p→ (q∧ r)
1,2,3 + + − −
4,5 + + + +
Consider also the two sub-profiles P1 consisting of voters 1, 2 and 3, and P2 con-
sisting of voters 4 and 5. Observe that RdH ,max(P1) = {{p,q,¬r,¬(p → (q∧ r))}}
and RdH ,max(P2) = {{p,q,r, p→ (q∧ r)}} , thus p ∈ TRdH ,max(P1) and p ∈ TRdH ,max(P2).
However, RdH ,max(P)= {{p,q,¬r,¬(p→ (q∧r))},{p,q,r, p→ (q∧r)},{¬p,q,¬r, p→
(q∧ r)},{p,¬q,r,¬(p→ (q∧ r))}}, therefore p 6∈ TRdH ,max(P). 
30
7 Conclusion
We have studied seven judgment aggregation rules. Four of them had already been
defined elsewhere — three of them in [25] — but had not been studied from the point
of views of the properties we considered here. The other three (RY , RMSA and RRA) are
totally new. We have extensively studied the inclusion (or noninclusion) relationships
between these 7 rules (Table 7). Then we have focuses on three desirable properties
of judgment aggregation rules and identified which of our rules satisfy them (with one
missing result). The table below summarizes the results.
Majority
Preservation
Weak
Unananimity
Strong
Unaninimity
Reinforcement Separability
RY X X X no no
RMSA X X no X no
RMCSA X no no X no
RMWA X no no X no
RRA X X X X no
RdH ,max no no no no no
RMNAC X no no ? no
Table 15: Summary of the results for the social theoretic properties of the judgment
aggregation rules.
Obviously, many other meaningful properties should be investigated, and even if it
would be premature to make a conclusion given the few properties we considered, we
may still observe that RRA Pareto-dominates all other rules in terms if the properties
satisfied.
It is also vital to consider the computational properties of the rules we introduce,
such as complexity of winner determination (see [14]). Another issue that we plan
to investigate in the future is the strategic aspect of our aggregation rules (as done in
judgment aggregation [7]), that is, how voters can strategically submit insincere judg-
ment sets in order to induce specific outcomes. These computational and manipulation
issues will be addressed in a future paper.
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